How secure are banks?

                                                           

OPEN PAGE (March 18, 1986)

How secure are banks?

(By C.S. Krishnamurthy)

"Armed men rob bank", "Rs.14 lakh stolen from bank", "City bank manager murdered".  Dailies greet you with such pungent headlines.  Crimes in general are on the rise.  Banks are potential treasure chests for criminals, since currency is obviously more tempting and less traceable than other valuables.

The daring hold-up of the Karnataka Bank in Madras some time ago with the diabolical murder of a bank official, still green in memory, showed that such offences are not exclusive to the north.

Socio-economic and political reasons alone with the negative application of technological innovations have abetted organised crime.

Statistics put the number of  robberies/dacoities at only three in 1973.  It has mounted at least 20 times annually in recent times.

"Modus operandi"

It is interesting to know the modus operandi.  A gang of bandits loot at gun-point during banking hours or prior to opening or soon after the business time.  They lock up the entire staff, often in the strong room, and use the keys obtained to rummage the lockers and flee with the booty.  Some vanish after extracting currency bundles from the cashier.

Bank funds are robbed while in transit from one bank to another on public roads, the looters at times killing the driver and security guard in the vehicle.

Removal of money from cashiers or customers by diverting their attention, using a blade to cut the wallet, or stealthily throwing some "itching" powder on the victim and suggesting that he go for a wash are other tricks of the trade!  While distracting the attention, the culprit flicks the cash and passes it on to his associates though he himself may still be present, consoling the victim!

How do they plan and execute it?  Dacoits mostly in the 20-25 age group, work overtime to accomplish their target.  Frustration in life, failure in securing jobs, glorification of horror,  settling political vendetta are the usual reasons that make a delinquent.

Ninety to ninety five per cent of the crimes are successfully carried out, says a security official of a leading bank.  Their preliminary planning dwells on how many are to operate.  The number is kept to three or four.  To draw a detailed plan, they spot the target and closely study the bank's mode of functioning, for which even neighbouring premises may be hired.

The time of operation: bandits prefer minimum staff and no customers.  The vulnerable time: around 11 a.m. when the staff go in groups for tea/cigaratte; lunch-break when other staff leave and the cashier is alone to close the counter; or evening, when the deposit is removed to the "safe-room".  The duration of the operation: An average of 10 minutes; most masterly loots are over in seven to eight minutes.  The operating time is minimised as the chances of their actions being observed are greater.

After looting, they flee using a vehicle, often stolen with changed number plates.  Vehicles, preferably two-wheelers in immaculate condition, are spotted ahead.  The local law and order situation, alternative routes against the blockade (like a procession) are considered in their escape plan.

The post-nationalisation period had witnessed a high rate of branch expansion and functional diversification, with emphasis on rural and urban areas.  There are over 40,000 branches as against 8,262 in 1969.  This swift expansion, however, is not reflected in the infrastructural base.  Some branches are sadly located in lanes where even an auto cannot enter.

Another reason relates to the flouting of norms and procedures.  Cash remittance from one branch to another, or to the Currency Chest or the RBI must be transported only in an enclosed vehicle.  Strangely, remittances are effected even by cycle-rickshaws! While cameras are banned in many public places, they can easily be brought inside the banking premises during busy hours - a vulnerable prelude indeed to a hold up!

The conspicuous absence of armed guards make "late sitting" of officials more hazardous.  Blind faith in colleagues, negligence in properly latching the cashier cabin door from inside and accepting cash after business hours are often over-looked.  White-collared bank staff often invariably deal with white-collared customers.  Criminals, on the other hand, are well trained to challenge the staff, with violence if necessary, to  hit their target.

A joint-custodian of  the Currency Chest of a nationalised  bank observes: "As long as the currency in the banks is insured against robberies, bankers will continue to be lethargic.  Insurance companies, more business-oriented, do not even insist that certain norms like provision of armed guards, ensuring safe and secure premises, etc. to be observed".  He is outraged that culprits, after being nabbed, are imprisoned for a year or two before being released to resume their activities, instead of being dealt with sternly.  He cites the Emergency period when the miscreants were aptly dealt with and the crime rate was negligible.  It is the intervention of political pressure that obstructs the punishment process, he deplores.

Comments an executive with three decades of experience: "As bankers, our role is limited. The government has a greater responsibility in controlling the menace.  A hot line between the branch and the nearest police station is essential".

Effective aids

A senior inspecting official says: "Police personnel report daily at all Calcutta banks at the opening hour and remain till the cash is taken back to the strong room.  All branches have a siren and the panic buttons are concealed in three places - one each in the manager's and cashier's cabins, the third at some other desk.  Access to any of these during a hold-up will the raise the alarm".

A bank officer reveals that a new electronic alarm is being devised, which sets off panic signal when a key is pushed to unlock the "safe-room".  A former chairman of a primary bank suggests making in-depth studies of ten cases and analysis of the weaknesses of the system.

What is to be done after a hold up?  Apart from contacting the police control room (in a  city) or the nearest police station, note the vehicle number of the escape vehicle, its make, type, prints, etc.  The crime scene must be left intact to help sleuths trace clues.  Forensic experts confirm even  cigarette-buds and sweat stains help identify the blood group.  Blood stains, voice, eyes, feet, vaccination marks, scars, height, weight, colour, hair (in a comparitive manner) are effective aids for follow-up.

Laments a Director General of Police: "When crimes are committed against individuals the victims provide a continuous source of motivation that helps in the pursuit of clues.  Crimes occurring in public institutions, however, lack such individual and enthusiastic sources of inspiration".

What can be done? Armed guards should be posted before every bank door and secure premises selected.  Shutters should be unfailingly pulled down after banking hours.  A half-closed door is as good as open.  Alarm bells and emergency lamps should be fitted inside the strong room, and access to cash vaults must be strictly confined to authorised personnel.  Surplus cash (cash in excess of sanctioned limit) must be scrupulously remitted to the bank's Currency Chest, the Reserve Bank, or needy banks.

Joint-custodians should not leave the keys of the strong room in their table drawers overnight.  The location of the manager's cabin must ensure his visual supervision of all the departments, particularly the cash counter.  The training curriculum of staff should include lectures/group-discussions/ and role-play on this subject.  Checking unauthorised loitering and prominent display of warning notices to alert the public must be observed.  Arrangement of cash counters in such a manner that movement towards the exit door is delayed, is worth pondering.  Finally, the Police should be trained to nab culprits with minimum identity data.

======