OPEN PAGE (March 18, 1986)
How secure are banks?
(By C.S. Krishnamurthy)
"Armed men rob bank", "Rs.14 lakh stolen from bank",
"City bank manager murdered".
Dailies greet you with such pungent headlines. Crimes in general are on the rise. Banks are potential treasure chests for
criminals, since currency is obviously more tempting and less traceable than
other valuables.
The daring hold-up of the Karnataka Bank in Madras some time ago with the
diabolical murder of a bank official, still green in memory, showed that such
offences are not exclusive to the north.
Socio-economic and political reasons alone with the
negative application of technological innovations have abetted organised crime.
Statistics put the number of robberies/dacoities at only three in
1973. It has mounted at least 20 times
annually in recent times.
"Modus operandi"
It is interesting to know the modus operandi. A gang of bandits loot at gun-point during
banking hours or prior to opening or soon after the business time. They lock up the entire staff, often in the
strong room, and use the keys obtained to rummage the lockers and flee with the
booty. Some vanish after extracting
currency bundles from the cashier.
Bank funds are robbed while in transit from one bank to another on public
roads, the looters at times killing the driver and security guard in the
vehicle.
Removal of money from cashiers or customers by diverting their attention,
using a blade to cut the wallet, or stealthily throwing some
"itching" powder on the victim and suggesting that he go for a wash
are other tricks of the trade! While
distracting the attention, the culprit flicks the cash and passes it on to his
associates though he himself may still be present, consoling the victim!
How do they plan and execute it?
Dacoits mostly in the 20-25 age group, work overtime to accomplish their
target. Frustration in life, failure in
securing jobs, glorification of horror,
settling political vendetta are the usual reasons that make a
delinquent.
Ninety to ninety five per cent of the crimes are successfully carried out,
says a security official of a leading bank.
Their preliminary planning dwells on how many are to operate. The number is kept to three or four. To draw a detailed plan, they spot the target
and closely study the bank's mode of functioning, for which even neighbouring
premises may be hired.
The time of operation: bandits prefer minimum staff and no customers. The vulnerable time: around 11 a.m. when the
staff go in groups for tea/cigaratte; lunch-break when other staff leave and
the cashier is alone to close the counter; or evening, when the deposit is
removed to the "safe-room".
The duration of the operation: An average of 10 minutes; most masterly
loots are over in seven to eight minutes.
The operating time is minimised as the chances of their actions being
observed are greater.
After looting, they flee using a vehicle, often stolen with changed number
plates. Vehicles, preferably
two-wheelers in immaculate condition, are spotted ahead. The local law and order situation,
alternative routes against the blockade (like a procession) are considered in
their escape plan.
The post-nationalisation period had witnessed a high rate of branch
expansion and functional diversification, with emphasis on rural and urban
areas. There are over 40,000 branches as
against 8,262 in 1969. This swift
expansion, however, is not reflected in the infrastructural base. Some branches are sadly located in lanes
where even an auto cannot enter.
Another reason relates to the flouting of norms and procedures. Cash remittance from one branch to another,
or to the Currency Chest or the RBI must be transported only in an enclosed
vehicle. Strangely, remittances are
effected even by cycle-rickshaws! While cameras are banned in many public
places, they can easily be brought inside the banking premises during busy
hours - a vulnerable prelude indeed to a hold up!
The conspicuous absence of armed guards make "late sitting" of
officials more hazardous. Blind faith in
colleagues, negligence in properly latching the cashier cabin door from inside
and accepting cash after business hours are often over-looked. White-collared bank staff often invariably
deal with white-collared customers.
Criminals, on the other hand, are well trained to challenge the staff,
with violence if necessary, to hit their
target.
A joint-custodian of the Currency
Chest of a nationalised bank observes:
"As long as the currency in the banks is insured against robberies, bankers
will continue to be lethargic. Insurance
companies, more business-oriented, do not even insist that certain norms like
provision of armed guards, ensuring safe and secure premises, etc. to be
observed". He is outraged that
culprits, after being nabbed, are imprisoned for a year or two before being
released to resume their activities, instead of being dealt with sternly. He cites the Emergency period when the
miscreants were aptly dealt with and the crime rate was negligible. It is the intervention of political pressure
that obstructs the punishment process, he deplores.
Comments an executive with three decades of experience: "As bankers,
our role is limited. The government has a greater responsibility in controlling
the menace. A hot line between the
branch and the nearest police station is essential".
Effective aids
A senior inspecting official says: "Police personnel report daily at
all Calcutta banks at the opening hour and remain till the cash is taken back
to the strong room. All branches have a
siren and the panic buttons are concealed in three places - one each in the
manager's and cashier's cabins, the third at some other desk. Access to any of these during a hold-up will
the raise the alarm".
A bank officer reveals that a new electronic alarm is being devised, which
sets off panic signal when a key is pushed to unlock the
"safe-room". A former chairman
of a primary bank suggests making in-depth studies of ten cases and analysis of
the weaknesses of the system.
What is to be done after a hold up?
Apart from contacting the police control room (in a city) or the nearest police station, note the
vehicle number of the escape vehicle, its make, type, prints, etc. The crime scene must be left intact to help
sleuths trace clues. Forensic experts
confirm even cigarette-buds and sweat
stains help identify the blood group.
Blood stains, voice, eyes, feet, vaccination marks, scars, height,
weight, colour, hair (in a comparitive manner) are effective aids for
follow-up.
Laments a Director General of Police: "When crimes are committed
against individuals the victims provide a continuous source of motivation that
helps in the pursuit of clues. Crimes
occurring in public institutions, however, lack such individual and
enthusiastic sources of inspiration".
What can be done? Armed guards should be posted before every bank door and
secure premises selected. Shutters
should be unfailingly pulled down after banking hours. A half-closed door is as good as open. Alarm bells and emergency lamps should be
fitted inside the strong room, and access to cash vaults must be strictly
confined to authorised personnel.
Surplus cash (cash in excess of sanctioned limit) must be scrupulously
remitted to the bank's Currency Chest, the Reserve Bank, or needy banks.
Joint-custodians should not leave the keys of the strong room in their
table drawers overnight. The location of
the manager's cabin must ensure his visual supervision of all the departments,
particularly the cash counter. The
training curriculum of staff should include lectures/group-discussions/ and
role-play on this subject. Checking
unauthorised loitering and prominent display of warning notices to alert the
public must be observed. Arrangement of
cash counters in such a manner that movement towards the exit door is delayed,
is worth pondering. Finally, the Police
should be trained to nab culprits with minimum identity data.
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